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Graham Priest in collaboration with J. Garfield and
Y. Deguchi (henceforth: DGP) wrote several articles
and responses arguing that the Buddhist philosopher
Na¯ga¯rjuna was a dialetheist thinker, i.e. that he not
just identified and exposed certain contradictions but
that he embraced it. These contradictions, according
to DGP, always occur “at the limits of thought” i.e.
when a certain view at the same time transcends the
limit (“transcendence”) and is within that limit (“clo-
sure”). In Na¯ga¯rjuna’s case, these limital contradic-
tions arise at the boundary between “conventional
reality/truth” (sam. vr. ti-sat/satya) and “ultimate real-
ity/truth” (parama¯rtha-sat/satya). Ultimate truth is
that things lack intrinsic nature (svabha¯va), i.e. that
they are empty (´su¯nya) of intrinsic nature. This empti-
ness is universal and it includes emptiness itself (empti-
ness of emptiness). But that means that being empty
is intrinsic property of all things so it comes out that
things both have (conventional truth) and lack (ul-
timate truth) intrinsic nature. This is ontological
paradox. DGP identify also semantic and express-
ibility paradoxes in Na¯ga¯rjuna. Although logically
coherent and philosophically intriguing, I think that
DGP’s interpretation nevertheless overlooks a spe-
cial kind of semantics that, presumably, works be-
hind Na¯ga¯rjuna’s reasoning and that would be best
described in terms of difference between first and sec-
ond order statements, i.e. between terms referring to
the world (primary system) and terms referring to the
primary system (meta-system, comprising the “meta”
concept of emptiness). Working in these two seman-
tic levels Na¯ga¯rjuna, I believe, escapes contradictions
— and Na¯ga¯rjuna is aware of them — that arise “at the
limits of thought”.
Keywords: Na¯ga¯rjuna, Candrak¯ırti, emptiness, se-
mantics, contradiction, paradox
Graham Priest in collaboration with
J. Garfield (henceforth : GP) and re-
cently also with Y. Deguchi (hence-
forth: DGP) wrote several articles and
responses1 arguing that the Buddhist
philosopher Na¯ga¯rjuna, founder of the
Madhyamaka (“Middle Way”) school
(probably 2nd C.E.) was a dialetheist
thinker, i.e. that he not just identified
and exposed certain contradictions but
that he (somehow) embraced it as an in-
evitable outcome of his understanding
and analysis of reality . These contra-
dictions, according to DG, always oc-
cur “at the limits of thought” i.e. when
a certain view at the same time tran-
scends the limit (“transcendence”) and is
within that limit (“closure”). (Garfield,
J. L. and Priest, G. 2003: p. 4) In
Na¯ga¯rjuna’s case, these limital contra-
dictions arise at the boundary between
“conventional reality/truth” (sam. vr. ti-
sat/satya) and “ultimate reality/truth”
(parama¯rtha-sat/satya).
1Cf. “Philosophy East and West”, vol. 63. no. 3
(2013) that is entirely dedicated to the present
issue.
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1. Na¯ga¯rjuna’s basic “position” and philosophical strategy (attack on
essentialism of any kind):
Before we proceed to investigate more closely DGP’s reading of Na¯ga¯rjuna it would
not be out of place here to picture at least some basics of Na¯ga¯rjuna’s philosophical
endeavour.
1. We cannot establish or explain any (obvious) relation existing between entities
if we assume that they exist inherently (by themselves, svabha¯va, “inherent
nature”). E.g. a seed and a sprout are in obvious relation (of “cause” and
“effect”). We can assume that they are identical or different. But if identical,
there is no relation and hence no base for distinction between them, and if
different, again no relation because of complete “otherness” existing between
them.2 “Inherent nature” of something, “existing by itself”, etc. (and a world-
view based on it), are completely fictitious concepts/terms that are not just
misguided but also block any coherent and contradictions-free understanding
of reality.
2. Hence, Na¯ga¯rjuna claims, all entites whatsoever are “devoid of inherent nature”
(nih. svabha¯va) and that is to say that they are empty (´su¯nya). And only if empty
(or because of being empty), we can make sense of obviuos interrelatedness
we encounter in our experience of the reality. Can we find anything in the
world that could satisfy requirements for being self-established, i.e. not created
by/dependent on something other?3
3. What Na¯ga¯rjuna in most cases philosophically does (convincingly or not)
then is reducing to absurd (prasan˙ga) absolutistic (svabha¯va - based) stando-
points/propositions drawing many unacceptable consequences (or contradic-
tions) issuing from them. In doing so, it is now generally agreed upon, he does
not violate any fundamental law of reasoning (or classical logic), e.g. Law of
the Excluding Middle (cf. MMK 2.8.: “A goer does not go, and a non-goer
does not go; what third one other than goer and non-goer goes?”), and Law
2If A possesses inherent nature i.e. exists by itself (svabha¯va) it means, among other things, that
there cannot be anything from “outside” that could constitute its fundamental (numerical) identity.
Otherwise at least some of its nature or identity would be “borrowed”, i.e. shared with something
else. Hence the only relation that could obtain between self-existing entities is the relation of
(complete) otherness.
3Candrak¯ırti (7t h C.E.), a celebrated commentator of Na¯ga¯rjuna’s MMK, states that if someone holds
the view that things possess inherent nature (svabha¯va) he would consequently be forced to accept
following characterizations: a) things are not artificial (akr. trima), i.e. not depending on other, b)
things do not occur after having previously been non-existent, c) things are not dependent on causes
and conditions (for their existence) (comm. to MMK 15. 2.). But such a thing obviously cannot be
found anywhere.
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of Contradiction (cf. MMK 8.7.: “An agent who is both existent and non-
existent does not perform an action that is both existent and non-existent, for
they are mutually contradictory, paraspara-viruddha. Where can existent and
non-existent co-exist?”)
4. Now in two places in all of his known writings he introduces the idea of “two
truths” (dve satye):
“The teaching of the Law of the Buddhas is relied on two truths: the Truth of
Mundane-Transactional-Expressional (lokasam. vr. tisatya) and the Truth of the
Highest Meaning (Ultimate Truth, parama¯rthasatya). Without relying on the
Conventional (vyavaha¯ra) the Highest Meaning (parama¯rtha) is not instructed;
without entering the Highest Meaning, Nirva¯n. a is not attained.” (MMK 24. 8,
10)
He does not, however, explain anywhere what is the “content” of both truths,
especially the “content” of the parama¯rthasatya.4
5. As for the Truth of Mundane-Transactional-Expressional (lokasam. vr. tisatya) it
is more or less obvious that it comprises generally accepted mental (reasoning
procedures included) and linguistic “patterns” through which we make sense
of the world. Candrak¯ırti (comm. to MMK 24. 8.): “All these practical
orders: denomination, the object of denomination, knowledge, the object
of knowledge, etc.,[we may add: truth and falsity, good and bad, one and
many, parts and the whole. . . ] are without exception called truth of mundane-
conventional-expressional.” It is not admissible nor even possible to transgress
these patterns or “practical orders”.
6. But what is possible and in fact what is constantly occuring especially in
philosophy, religion, etc., is that these “practical orders” become “reified”
or “proliferated” (prapañca) through the concept (and mental behaviour) of
“inherent nature/existence” (svabha¯va). Thus e.g. when it is stated that a sprout
arises from a seed there is nothing wrong with that statement. It is based
on the conventional pattern called causation that is verified by experience
– hence generally accepted. But as soon as one is engaged in investigation
of this occurrence (“theories” of causation) he almost unconsciously starts
to impute or “superimpose” (sama¯ropa) certain features (concepts, ideas etc.
thought to be real) upon it that are not just, according to Madhyamaka, non-
referential (i.e. fictional) but, probably because of that, also burdened with
4Note that satya does not mean “reality” (sat) but “truth”. In some other Buddhist schools, e.g.
Sarva¯stiva¯da, we find the idea of two realities – parama¯rtha-sat, absolute/ultimate existence and
sam. vr. ti-sat, conventional/relative existence, but not in Na¯ga¯rjuna. It seems, however, that GDP
understand satya here both in a sense of existence/reality and truth almost interchangeable paving
the way thus for ontologicial reading of Na¯ga¯rjuna ’s theses.
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contradicitons (cause is identical with effect, is different from it, etc). Thus,
according to Madhyamaka, all we do in our attempt to understand reality
and in searching for its ultimate foundation is reification of fictional and non-
referential concepts, ideas, beliefs, etc. constantly imposed upon reality. The
concept of “svabha¯va” (inherent nature) symbolizes, so to speak, this mental
behaviour and is at the same time self-imposed cause of our fundamental
ignorance about the reality and everything regarding the reality.
Now, it seems that the main Na¯ga¯rjuna’s philosophical concern is to expose the
absurdity of the concept of “inherent nature” or more generally to show that any
attempt to find any absolut (metaphysical) foundation of things is doomed to failure.
And that is because there is no such thing as “inherent nature”. So far so good.
It could seem a reasonable (whether convincing or not) philosophical position
regarding things.
But what about emptiness (´su¯nyata¯) of things? Is it a foundational property (“being
empty”) of things just as for a (at least Indian) realist “inherently existing” is a
foundational property of things? And is this property related to the Truth of the
Highest Meaning (“Ultimate Truth”)? If so, then this concept does not operate
within conventional-expressional domain (sam. vr. ti). But that cannot be since, ac-
cording to Madhyamaka, everything that is (meaningfully) expressible is within
the domain of conventional.
2. GP and DGP theses
Now it’s a time to briefly introduce GP and DGP’s discover of “limit contradictions”
in Na¯ga¯rjuna’s analysis of reality that he himself is aware of and accepts which makes
him, according to DGP, a dialetheist thinker. They identify three fundamental
contradictions and paradoxes “at the limits of thought” discovered by Na¯ga¯rjuna and
all of them concerns concepts of emptiness and the Truth of the Highest Meaning
(Ultimate Truth, parama¯rthasatya):
- Ontological contradiction: “Things have no nature, and that is their nature. To
be empty is to be empty of intrinsic properties. Everything is empty, and so
has no intrinsic properties. But: something is an intrinsic property of x if
it would have it even if x were the only thing in existence. Therefore being
empty is an intrinsic property. For being empty is part of something’s nature
(essence), and so it would have it whenever it existed.” (Deguchi, Y., Garfield,
J. L. and Priest, G. 2013a, p. 426).5
5The same ontological paradox is stated also elsewhere with a bit different wordings: “ First, it is
central to Madhyamaka that emptiness is the emptiness of intrinsic nature. That things are ultimately
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- Semantic paradox: “There are no ultimate truths (’Ultimate truths are those
about ultimate reality. But since everything is empty, there is no ultimate
reality. There are, therefore, no ultimate truths. All truths, then, are merely
conventional’, Garfield, J. L. and Priest, G. 2003, p. 10) and it is ultimately
true that everything is empty. There is no ultimate reality (distinct from
conventional reality). Ultimate truth is the truth about such a reality. Ultimate
reality provides the truthmakers of such claims. Therefore, there is no ultimate
truth. But there is at least one ultimate truth, namely that everything is empty.
(Deguchi, Y., Garfield, J. L. and Priest, G. 2013a, ibid.; cf. also Deguchi, Y.,
Garfield, J. L. and Priest, G. 2013b, ibid.)
- Expressibility paradox: “there are no ultimate truths; but there are, for example,
that is one. Ultimate reality is nondual. One cannot, therefore, apply concepts
to it. So it is ineffable. But one can say things about it (e.g., in explaining why
it is ineffable), so there are ultimate truths.” (Deguchi, Y., Garfield, J. L. and
Priest, G. 2013b, ibid.)6
3. Critical remarks
DGP think that for Na¯ga¯rjuna the content of the ultimate truth is the fact that
things are empty (that is universal claim and includes the emptiness itself along
with the statement that things are empty). But then since everything is empty,
there is no ultimate truth/reality. But again, according to DGP, there are ultimate
truths and MMK is “full of them” (Garfield, J. L. and Priest, G. 2003, p. 11). Now
I procede to analyze briefly some of Na¯ga¯rjuna’s stanzas that according to DGP
speak about ultimate truth (ultimate state of affairs) generating at the same time
contradictions “at the limits”.
MMK 24.19: “Something that is not dependently arisen, such a thing does not exist.
Therefore a nonempty thing does not exist.”
According to DGP this is a statement about the nature of ultimate reality. But I
think it is not. All Na¯ga¯rjuna is doing here is providing (convincingly or not) an
argument against the possibility of a self-established thing. This is purely conducted
within the “pattern” of conventional, just as when someone says “I receive money
empty is affirmed, and, hence, it is affirmed that things have no intrinsic nature. But an intrinsic
nature is a property that a thing has on its own, independently of all else, essentially “from its
own side.” Emptiness is such a property. Hence, things, by virtue of being essentially empty, have
an intrinsic nature, that is, emptiness, which is the absence of any intrinsic nature.“ (Deguchi, Y.,
Garfield, J. L. and Priest, G. 2013b, p. 395)
6Cf. also: “Since all words and concepts fabricate and falsify, and ultimate truth characterizes reality
free from fabrication, just as it is, ultimate truth is inexpressible. But we have just expressed something
true about it.“ (Deguchi, Y., Garfield, J.L. and Priest, G. 2013b, ibid.)
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from my parents and so I am not financially independent”. Candrak¯ırti is very
specific about Madhyamaka’s philosophical arumentation. They do not frame any
reasoning procedure that could be (formally) unacceptable for their opponents.
They just follow accepted reasoning standards (hence convention) but use them
against their opponents’ theses drawing unacceptable consequences issuing from
them.
MMK 18.8.: “Everything is real and is not real, both real and not real, neither real
nor not real. This is Lord Buddha’s teaching.” (GP’s translation; Garfield, J. L. and
Priest, G. 2003, p. 16)
At the first glance this statement is obviously riddled with contradictions, but not
if the sanskrit word anu´sa¯sana (“teaching”) is translated with more precision as
“graded” or “progressive” teaching.7 Normal sanskrit word for teaching is s´a¯sana
(e.g. in MMK 18.11). Here it is introduced the concept of different Buddha’s
teachings according to the “state of mind” (advanced or not so advanced) of his
listeners.8 Such a method of teaching (according to the situation) is accomodated
to conventional ways of speaking and obviously does not represent an attempt to
define ultimate and ineffable reality.9
MMK 22.11: “’Empty” should not be asserted, ’nonempty’ should not be asserted.
Neither both nor neither should be asserted. These are used only nominally.” (GP’s
translation, Garfield, J. L. and Priest, G. 2003, p. 14)
Again, seemingly contradictory statement because of the wrong translation of the
7“When prefixed to nouns anu- means progressive, each by each, orderly, one after another.” (Ruegg
D. S., 2010, p. 44)
8The idea of “graded teaching” can be found also in other Na¯ga¯rjuna’s works; cf. YS´ 30: “To seekers
of reality at first you should declare ‘everything exists’! Once they understand things and grow
detached, then (you may teach) them freedom”. Candrak¯ırti (comm.): “Those who are seeking
truth motivated by their habitual self-preoccupation tend to be attached to things, so first you
must teach them that “everything exists” and then correctly describe (for them) the objects of their
desire, since they delight in analyzing the natures of those things.” (Loizzo, J. 2007, p. 180-181):
Cf. also Na¯ga¯rjuna’s S´S (verse 44): “There exists the statement of existence and also the statement
of non-existence and again the statement of both existence and non-existence. The intentional
proclamations of the Buddhas are not easily penetrated.” The (auto)commentary explains that all
of these statements exists (only) through superimposition or imputation and so cannot be taken
literally (cf. Santina, P. D., p. 148)
9DGP’s understanding of anu´sa¯sana merely as a (fixed) “teaching” led them to view this stanza
as a purely theoretical statement about (ultimate) reality that generates contradictions: “Many
contradictions do not occur in an immediately soteriological context; they occur in theoretical
discourse about Buddhism, such as Na¯ga¯rjuna’s MMK (above stanza, 18.8). Contradictions in this
context are not uttered simply for the psychological effect that they have on the listeners; in general,
they are not intended to trigger fundamental psychological transformation.” (Deguchi, Y., Garfield,
J. L. and Priest, G. 2008, p. 397).
40
G. Kardaš | Some (critical) remarks on Priest’s dialetheist reading of Na¯ga¯rjuna
first and the crucial part of the stanza: It shoud be read: “’Empty’ should not be
asserted or else there would be ‘non empty’ . . . ” (´su¯nyamiti na vaktavyama´su¯nyamiti
va¯ bhavet )
Candrak¯ırti (comm): “So, relying on conventional truth (vyavaha¯rasatya), by impu-
tation (a¯ropatah. ) we say “empty” with a view to conventional usage by accommo-
dation to people who are to be trained. And we also say ‘non-empty’,’empty and
non-empty’, and ‘neither empty nor non-empty’.” (Ruegg, D. S. 2010, p. 56) So,
the term “empty” by itself cannot have any special status among other terms within
the frame of dichotomizing conceptualization which involves the logically comple-
mentary and opposite concepts (long-short, truth-falsity, conventional-ultimate,
empty-nonempty etc.)
Finally, MMK 13.7. clearly states that “emptiness” should not be understood as
an description of the Ultimate Reality (emptiness is not the ultimate “nature” of
anything instead of some other ultimate property, e.g. “inherent nature”):
“If something not empty existed, something called ‘empty’ would exist; something
not empty does not exist, and how will there [then] exist something empty?”
Buddhapa¯lita (5. C.E.) comm.: “Those who view emptiness as a thing because
it exists separately from the mere expression ‘emptiness’ have their mental eyes
obscured by the great darkness of ignorance.” (Saito, 1984, p. 186)
Obviously, Buddhapa¯lita criticizes those who hold that word’s referents necessarily
exist as things, that the word “emptiness” has its real referent somewhere “out
there”.
Let us also check the most celebrated stanza of MMK (18.24):
“Whatever is dependent arising (prat¯ıtyasamutpa¯da), we call that ‘emptiness’ (´su¯nyata¯),
the latter (‘emptiness’) is the act of designating after relying (upon something,
prajñaptir upa¯da¯ya), and is itself the middle path.” (Salvini, M. 2011, p. 242)
There are numerous different analyses of this stanza, but I think that the message is
again very clear: emptiness has not some special status by itself among other terms,
nor does it refer to some special and “objective” state of affairs (that would make
Na¯ga¯rjuna a realist which he obviously is not); within the frame of dichotomizing
conceptualization it links itself (‘relying upon’) to the opposite concept of “inherent
nature” (svabha¯va). The idea that “emptiness” is the “concept based on” (notional
dependence) is paralleled with the idea that whatever can be said to exist, it exists
“in dependence upon” something (prat¯ıtyasamutpa¯da, “existential” dependence).
Hence, since there are no “isolated” things by themselves, there cannot be terms
(concepts) that could refer to these isolated “things”, emptiness included. We cannot
postulate (or even think of) “short” without the idea of “long”, truth without the
idea of falsity, emptiness without the idea of inheren nature, etc.
41
EUJAP | VOL. 11 | No. 2 | 2015
Cf. also Candrak¯ırti (comm. on YS´ 11b): “For if one imagines (parikalpa) that
things as perceived have some sort of intrinsically identifiable objectivity, since
these things would be mutually distinct entities, being ascertained as such, they
would necessarily be determinable (only) as individual particulars (vi´ses.a). For
(in such a view) one cannot determine the actuality of a thing through knowing
some other actuality, just as one cannot determine (the color) yellow by knowing
something blue.” (Loizzo, J. 2007, p. 158)
Since a word in Madhyamaka’s view inherently does not signify anything “real”
and isolated or inherently existing (as semantic realism assumes) it can only have
a function of positing its counter-part in the total web of designation within the
framework of conceptualization. According to Indian Grammarians, “meanings”
of words are either conventionally agreed upon through the generations of speakers
(in the case of everyday words) or individually intended (in the case of “tehnical”
terms, such as “emptiness”); cf. Candrak¯ırti: “But words are not like policemen.
They cannot subject a speaker to their own will. Although they possess the power
[to express], they are [actually] governed by the speaker’s intention.” (PP, 24. 1-2)
So Na¯ga¯rjuna in one place declares what is the “intended meaning” of “emptiness”:
MMK 13.8: “Emptiness has been declared by the Victors to be the cancellation of
all (on inherent nature based) views (dr. s.t. i). But those who have a view of Emptiness
they have said to be untreatable.”
Candrak¯ırti in his comment again warns us that emptiness does not refer to some
ultimate entity or property of any kind: “But simple cancellation of what are
(speculative) views is no substantial entity. Yet against those who are conceptually
attached to Emptiness as to a substantial entity (bha¯va¯bhinive´sin) we propound
nothing.”
So we learn that teaching of emptiness is not the teaching about ultimate nature
of things but a specially designed teaching (otherwise completely non-referential)
aiming at “purging” all views based on reified (svabha¯va) conceptualization. But
in that process it should also purge itself (Emptiness shoud not be understood as
another “view” hence “emptiness of emptiness”). That is intended meaning of
“emptiness”.
4. Making sense of Emptiness, Ultimate Reality and DGP thesis
I think that it is quite clear that:
1. “emptiness” does not refer to any kind of ultimate entity or ultimate property,
it is more like a metalinguistic term that guides Madhyamaka’s analysis of their
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opponent’ theses. In fact, “emptiness” could be understood as a third order
term within a following sheme:
- First order, non-analytical statement about the world that Madhyamaka
never argue against but quite contrary, e.g. purely conventional state-
ment: “the sprout arises from the seed”; cf. Candrak¯ırti, comm. on
YS´ 20: “For the things of the world cannot be accepted as (critically)
examined, but just (as presented) according to convention. . . . Since all
mundane conventions (laukika-vyavaha¯ra) are without (logical) justifi-
cation (upapatti) even the commonsense things in the world must be
established by worldly convention (loka-prasiddha¯rtha), not by (analytic)
validation.” (Loizzo, J. 2007, p. 170)
- Second order, analytical or “philosophical” statement about the world,
thought to establishes some ultimate state of affairs, e.g. “the sprout
pre-exists in the seed/has a different nature from the seed”, things exist
by their own nature, etc. Second order statements or propositions are
full of conceptually constructed terms and notions armed by which a
philosopher is in search for the ultimate foundation of things or ultimate
explanation of events not being satisfied (for some reasons) by the conven-
tional or non-analytical (first order) description of the world. According
to Madhyamaka, these second order statements and propositions are
roots of all delusions and distortions regarding the world. And the root
of all these roots is the false projection of the “inherent nature” (svabha¯va)
“upon otherwise innocuous objects of our customary world that do not
have such svabha¯va” as Tillemans pointed out. (Tillemans, T. 2001. p.
15).10
- Third order or “emptiness” statement, canceling the second order state-
ment, but not the first, e.g. “the seed and the sprout are empty of in-
herent nature”. It is crucial to note here, as was suggested by Robinson
(Robinson, R. H. 1978, p. 43 and 49) that “emptiness” is not another
or independent factor in philosophical analysis, but is, so to speak of
“parasitic” nature, i.e. without positing (by someone) second order state-
ment it cannot perform any meaningful function. To be more precise,
“emptiness” is a term in the descriptive or meta-system referring (by way
10GP also effectively phrased the same idea behind the Madhyamaka’s “deconstructivist” philosophical
project: “Penetrating to the depths of being, we find ourselves back on the surface of things, and
so discover that there is nothing, after all, beneath these deceptive surfaces. Moreover, what is
deceptive about them is simply the fact that we take there to be ontological depths lurking just
beneath.” (Garfield, J. L. and Priest, G. 2003, p. 15); cf. also Candrak¯ırti’s commentary to YS´ 20
above.
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of cancellation) to the primary (i.e. second order, svabha¯va-based state-
ments) system suposedly referring to the ultimate or objective state of
affairs.11
This idea is reflected in Candrak¯ırti’s observation that if human (philo-
sophical) minds were not inclined to reify or hypostatize concepts (e.g.
svabha¯va), nobody would ever teach emptiness.12 In a word, the notion
(and argument) of the emptiness of things can arise only in relation to
the illusion that inherent nature exists. But then it means that emptiness
is illusion too! And Na¯ga¯rjuna is quite clear about that: In VV discussing
the nature of his “thesis” namely that all things are empty of intrinsic
nature he compares it with the illusion that stops or prevents another
illusion (namely that of intrinsic nature) to arise.13
Hence, what is problematic with DGP theses is their analysis of Na¯ga¯rjuna’s state-
ments through the lens of semantic realism that Na¯ga¯rjuna most certainly rejects
as is evident especially in his VV. The whole misunderstanding between Na¯ga¯rjuna
and his opponent in this work is based exactly on the assumption of the later that
Na¯ga¯rjuna advances semantic realism regarding his thesis about universal emptiness
of all things. On the realistic assumption, the problem with this central Na¯ga¯rjuna’s
thesis is quite clear: If “all things are empty” is a universally valid claim, then it
means that this claim itself is empty too, and so it cannot be in position to negate
(e.g. inherent nature in things) or prevent anything. But this is exactly the point
Na¯ga¯rjuna has in mind. He does not negate (nor affirm) anything because there is
nothing graspable “out there” (in terms of inherent nature or “numerical” identity)
to be negated or affirmed (cf. VV 30 and 63). His thesis is as “empty” as any other,
it does not have any privileged semantic or ontological status by its own because
it is expressed in notional “dependence on” (prajñaptir upa¯da¯ya, MMK 18. 24, see
above), in our case in dependence on the second order statement, just as any other
statement or proposition.
11I would say metaphorically that “emptiness” is a black hole within the system of constructs that
constantly spreads out.
12Cf. also Ames (1982, p. 172): “ The notion of the non-existence of svabha¯va can arise only in
relation to the illusion that svabha¯va exists.”
13“It would be as if an artificial man hindered another artificial man engaged in some action or as
if an illusory man brought forth by an illusionist would hinder another illusory man engaged in
some action who was brought forth by the illusory man’s own illusory power. In this case the
artificial man who is hindered is empty, as is the one who hinders him. The illusory man who is
hindered is empty, as is the one who hinders him. Therefore in just the same way the negation of
the substance [svabha¯vapratis.edha] of all things is established by my empty speech [madvacanena
s´u¯nyena]”; autocommentary to VV 23 (trans. Westerhoff, J. 2010, p. 49-50).
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We can approach Na¯ga¯rjuna’s semantic anti-realism also from the conceptual frame-
work of classical Indian grammarians’ analysis of language-meaning.14 According
to the later, three notions are crucial here: basic linguistic element (´sabda) that is
the bearer of meaning, meaning itself (artha) and the expressional power (´sakti) of a
linguistic element. It is generally accepted and recognized that articulated (gram-
matically well formed) words and sentences generate some kind of understanding,
i.e. that they are “meaningful”, but the question is what is the nature of this under-
standing and especially its relation to things “out there”. This depends on how we
understand expressional power of linguistic items (´sakti). According to realists this
expressional power must be inborn or inherent or fixed in linguistic items because
it has to be assumed that language is intimately connected with the world “out
there” in undistorted way. If there is a word “apple” it exists because there exists
a corresponding thing that generates “apple-meaning” and that is because a word
“apple” itself has the inborn power to express this precise thing.
There is the fourth element in this analysis, namely “speaker’s intention” (ta¯tparya
or vivaks.a). In India it is early recognized as a factor that is significant to the
problem of meaning. The question is: What is relation between s´akti and ta¯tparya
or vivaks.a? If the expressional power of linguistic items is inborn, i.e. objective,
then “speaker’s intention” is of very limited impact on how meaning is generated.
But if opposite, then the later factor (speaker’s intention) is the one that actually
generates meaning. But if so, then there is a serious discordance between language
and reality. That does not, however, mean that facts of language become a nonsense,
but only that they do not (at least not directly) reflect “objective” reality (as a
realist assumes), but only “inner state of mind”. So, grammarians conclude (or at
least Bhartr.hari), what language expresses is not “primary being” (mukhyasatta¯) or
external and objective order of things (whose existence however they do not deny),
but rather “metaphorical” or “superimposed” reality (upaca¯ra satta¯) that exists only
in mind (cf. Va¯kyapad¯ıya, III, 3 and comm.).
Na¯ga¯rjuna, I think, made a step further in these considerations: Not only that
concepts and language do not and cannot touch upon reality in a way realist thinks
they do, but this reality itself is not “out there” as a realist thinks in a sense of
numerically identifiable “things”, objective processes and so on. Madhyamakas
have only one albeit fundamental definition or description of things and that is
the fact of mere condition-hood (idam. pratyayata¯ma¯tra). But even this definition or
description of reality is hardly understood by Madhyamakas as being objectively
“out there”. This description is just convenient framework within which the teaching
of emptiness could be rationally grounded and thus presented to others (if A depends
14That Na¯ga¯rjuna was significantly influenced by Indian grammarians is now well recognized, cf.
Bhattacharya 1980
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on B for its existence then A is empty of intrinsic nature, etc.).
Armed with above considerations let us check now more closely DGP’s contradic-
tions and paradoxes they have identified in Na¯ga¯rjuna’s philosophy. All of them
are based on semantic realism that Na¯ga¯rjuna do not adhere to and on realist meta-
physics that Na¯ga¯rjuna also do not adhere to. “Ontological contradiction” develops
from the premise “things have no nature, and that is their nature”. This premise
probably stems from one passage of Candrak¯ırti’s commentary to MMK 15.2.:
“And that inherent nature (svabha¯va) of things is . . . , because of being non-being
(abha¯va),. . . a mere non-inherent nature (asvabha¯va). In this context it should be
known that there is no inherent nature of things.” DGP somehow from here con-
clude that for Na¯ga¯rjuna or Madhyamaka absence of inherent nature or “no nature”
is the real nature of things and from here that “being empty” (of inherent nature) is
the universal property of things, “for being empty is part of something’s nature
(essence)”.15 (see above) This line (and the spirit) of (realistic) reasoning is exactly
the same as advanced by an opponent in VV against which Na¯ga¯rjuna employs his,
I believe, radical anti-realist semantics. What is “realistic” about DGP’s reasoning
is the concept of negation they employ which is the same as advanced by Nya¯ya
school (the main Indian representative of ontological and epistemological realism).
For Nya¯ya, negation is always implicative, i.e. the function of negation is operative
only in connection with some existing thing (subject of proposition) and refers to
its disconnection with certain time, place, property, etc., affirming or implying at
the same time its connection with some other time, place, property, etc.16 Hence
for Nya¯ya “things have no (inherent) nature” is meaningful statement only if it
implies that instead of property “inherent nature” we affirm some other property,
in our case, being empty (of inherent nature) in otherwise existing “thing”. But
this is exactly one of the major point of dispute between Na¯ga¯rjuna and Nya¯ya.
For the former there are no things and no properties (and hence no “referential”
propositions), “being empty” included, to which the negation (or affirmation) could
be attached to.17
To conclude: emptiness or “being empty” is not an intrinsic property of anything
nor is it description of things ultimately (Na¯ga¯rjuna nowhere in his writings links
emptiness with ultimate truth, much less with ultimate reality); it is just “context-
bound” (cf. Ruegg, D. S. 2000. p. 207-208) cancellation of the conceptual fiction
15Cf. Ames’ semantic interpretation of this seemingly paradoxical statement, namely that “intrinsic
nature of things is non-intrinsic nature” (Ames, 1982, p. 174).
16Cf. Nya¯yava¯rttika on Nya¯yasu¯tra 2. 1. 12.: “Because when the word ’pot’ etc. is coordinated
(sama¯na¯dhikaran. a) with (predicate) ‘does not exist’, it does not signify mere (absolute) non-existence
of the pot but rather (that predicate) negates connection of (that) pot with (certain) place (‘house’),
certain time or (negates certain causal) efficiency (sa¯marthya) of the pot.”
17I think that Na¯ga¯rjuna shares certain similarities with the so called Deflationary and Pragmatist
theories of truth.
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“inherent nature” (svabha¯va) held to be by his opponents ultimate truth regarding
things. This cancellation is “non-implicative” (prasajya), it does not affirm anything
instead, it cancels itself after canceling this fiction. Because it is also conceptual
fiction! Hence, no ontological contradiction.
But then also there is no semantic paradox to be found in Na¯ga¯rjuna part of which is
DGP’s statement “it is ultimately true that everything is empty”, nor expressibility
paradox part of which is the statement that the statement “everything is empty”
cannot be a conventional truth. The question is of course why Na¯ga¯rjuna introduces
the distinction between conventional and ultimate truth? The natural answer
would be – because there are two kinds of reality, conventional and ultimate. But I
think it is not at stake here because, as is, I hope, revealing here, Na¯ga¯rjuna is not
interested in relation between language and “reality” but rather between language
and (mental) behaviour. In that sense I have tried to show elsewhere18 that the
distinction between these two truths (as well as the argument for emptiness of things
based on the universal conditionality of things, prat¯ıtyasamutpa¯da) is introduced
by Na¯ga¯rjuna in order to prevent the fear in those (to be instructed) who could
understand the teaching of emptiness as entailing nihilism in a sense that things do
not exist at all, not even conventionally!
As for the purpose of the teaching of emptiness, it is well elaborated in Madhya-
maka’s writings and there is no need to discuss it here. It should be suffice to say (cf.
also “GP and DGP theses”, point 6, above) that for these philosophers the main
problem with (doxic) philosophical theses, views, standpoints, etc. is not their
problematic truth value bur rather their negative impact on human mind. They
generate mental „proliferations“ (prapañca) that disturb mind preventing it to see
and experience clearly and unbiasly things “as they are” (yatha¯bhu¯tam).
In this process of cleansing the mind the task of philosophy could be only one: “to
destroy adherence to language [or: verbal expressions] and secondly to the referents
of language” as was pointed out by Devas´arman in his (survived only in a few
quotations) commentary to MMK. (cf. Williams, P. M. 1980. p. 1)
18Kardaš, G. “Madhyamaka in Abhidharma S´a¯stras: The Case of Harivarman’s Tattvasiddhi” (forth-
coming), in: Dessein, B. and Teng, W. (eds.), Text, History, and Philosophy: Abhidharma across
Buddhist scholastic Traditions, Leiden: Brill.
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